Bounding the effects of food insecurity on children’s health outcomes by Gundersen, Craig & Kreider, Brent
Economics Publications Economics
9-2009
Bounding the effects of food insecurity on
children’s health outcomes
Craig Gundersen
University of Illinois
Brent Kreider
Iowa State University, bkreider@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Econometrics Commons, Food Security
Commons, Health Economics Commons, and the Health Policy Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/640. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Bounding the effects of food insecurity on children’s health outcomes
Abstract
Previous research has estimated that food insecure children are more likely to suffer from a wide array of
negative health outcomes than food secure children, leading many to claim that alleviating food insecurity
would lead to better health outcomes. Identifying the causal impacts is problematic, however, given
endogenous selection into food security status and potential mismeasurement of true food security status.
Using recently developed nonparametric bounding methods and data from the 2001-2006 National Health
and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES), we assess what can be identified about the effects of food
insecurity on child health outcomes in the presence of nonrandom selection and nonclassical measurement
error. Under relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, we can identify that food security has a statistically
significant positive impact on good general health and being a healthy weight. Our work suggests that previous
research has more likely underestimated than overestimated the causal impacts of food insecurity on health.
Keywords
food insecurity, health outcomes, nonclassical measurement error, nonparametric bounds, average treatment
effect
Disciplines
Behavioral Economics | Econometrics | Food Security | Health Economics | Health Policy
Comments
This is a manuscript of an article published as Gundersen, Craig, and Brent Kreider. "Bounding the effects of
food insecurity on children’s health outcomes." Journal of health economics 28, no. 5 (2009): 971-983. doi:
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.06.012. Posted with permission.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/640
Bounding the E¤ects of Food Insecurity on Childrens Health Outcomes
Craig Gundersen
University of Illinois
cggunder@illinois.edu
Brent Kreider
Iowa State University
bkreider@iastate.edu
June 2009
Abstract. Previous research has estimated that food insecure children are more likely to
su¤er from a wide array of negative health outcomes than food secure children, leading many
to claim that alleviating food insecurity would lead to better health outcomes. Identifying the
causal impacts is problematic, however, given endogenous selection into food security status and
potential mismeasurement of true food security status. Using recently developed nonparametric
bounding methods and data from the 2001-2006 National Health and Nutritional Examination
Survey (NHANES), we assess what can be identied about the e¤ects of food insecurity on child
health outcomes in the presence of nonrandom selection and nonclassical measurement error. Under
relatively weak monotonicity assumptions, we can identify that food security has a statistically
signicant positive impact on good general health and being a healthy weight. Our work suggests
that previous research has more likely underestimated than overestimated the causal impacts of
food insecurity on health.
Keywords: food insecurity; health outcomes; nonclassical measurement error; nonparametric bounds;
average treatment e¤ect
JEL classication: I32, I12
This research is funded through a RIDGE grant from the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture and the Harris School, University of Chicago. The views expressed in this paper are solely those
of the authors. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the ERS/Harris School RIDGE Workshop,
the RIDGE Conference, the Annual Meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management,
and the University of Illinois. The authors thank attendees at those venues, especially Tom DeLeire, and an
anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Brandie Ward provided excellent research assistance.
1
1 Introduction
Positive associations between food insecurity and poor health outcomes among children have been
widely documented. Previous research, spanning numerous academic studies, has found that chil-
dren in households su¤ering from food insecurity are more likely to have poor health (Cook et al.,
2004; Weinreb et al., 2002; Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones, 2003), psychosocial problems (Kleinman
et al., 1998; Weinreb et al., 2002; Murphy et al., 1998), frequent stomachaches and headaches
(Alaimo et al., 2001a), increased odds of being hospitalized (Cook et al., 2004), greater propensi-
ties to have seen a psychologist (Alaimo et al., 2001a), behavior problems (Slack and Yoo, 2005;
Whitaker et al., 2006), worse developmental outcomes (Jyoti et al., 2005; Rose-Jacobs et al., 2008),
more chronic illnesses (Weinreb et al., 2002), impaired functioning (Murphy et al., 1998), impaired
mental prociency (Zaslow et al., 2008), and higher levels of iron deciency with anemia (Skalicky
et al., 2006). Perhaps paradoxically, food insecurity has also been associated with higher propen-
sities to be obese (Casey et al., 2001; Casey et al., 2006; Dubois et al., 2006; Jyoti et al., 2005).
These consistently negative health ndings emerge from a variety of data sources, employ a variety
of statistical techniques, and appear to be robust to di¤erent measures of food insecurity.
Based on this evidence, most authors conclude that e¤orts to reduce food insecurity would lead
to improvements in these health outcomes. That is, if children in food insecure households were to
become food secure, they would be expected to achieve health outcomes like those in observationally
similar food secure households. The central vehicle for helping alleviate food insecurity among
children is the Food Stamp Program, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, p.7). This program directly
augments a households resources available for purchasing food. Prior research has suggested that
SNAP leads to reductions in food insecurity (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001). Other policies,
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and educational programs to assist families with
food budgeting, may indirectly alleviate food insecurity. More generally, any program that expands
a low-income households budget opportunities may lead to less food insecurity.
Irrespective of how policymakers pursue these improvements, the general conclusion that ef-
forts to reduce food insecurity would lead to improvements in health outcomes is tenuous for two
main reasons. First, food insecurity is not randomly distributed among the population. Even after
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controlling for characteristics that can be observed in the data, there may remain important un-
observed factors that lead some children to be simultaneously at higher risk of being food insecure
and of being in poor health. Due to these unobserved inuences, a policy prescription that would
alleviate food insecurity among these children, even if worthwhile on other grounds, might not lead
to the predicted improvements in health status.
Second, this literature presumes that food insecurity is accurately measured in household sur-
veys. However, food insecurity status may be mismeasured for a variety of reasons. Food insecurity
is partially subjective, and there may be divergences between how experts and various households
interpret the survey questions (Gundersen and Ribar, 2004). Even if food insecurity were objec-
tively dened, some parents might misreport being food secure if they feel ashamed about heading
a household in which their children are not getting enough food to eat (Hamelin et al., 2002).
Alternatively, some households might misreport being food insecure if they believe that reporting
otherwise could jeopardize their eligibility for an assistance program especially one that provides
food assistance, like SNAP. More generally, validation studies consistently reveal large degrees of
response error in popular surveys, even for variables thought to be relatively objective. In an im-
portant survey of the causes and consequences of measurement error, Bound et al. (2001) conclude
that response error constitutes a serious problem for applied econometric work across a wide range
of topics. Moreover, they nd little reason to believe that such errors tend to occur randomly.
Instead, they provide evidence that response errors tend to be correlated with the underlying vari-
able of interest and common socioeconomic attributes. Consistent with this concern, Black et al.
(2003) nd that more than a third of respondents to the U.S. Census reporting a professional de-
gree have no such degree, with widely varying patterns of false positive and false negative reports
across demographic groups. A priori, there seems to be good reason to consider the consequences
of at least some small degree of misclassication in food insecurity responses. Even small degrees
of classication error can lead to large degrees of uncertainty for inferences.1
In this paper, we reconsider what can be learned about the e¤ects of food security on child health
outcomes when formally accounting for the uncertainty created by unobserved counterfactuals and
1 In a regression setting, Kreider (forthcoming) nds that health insurance misclassication rates of less than
1.3 percent are su¢ cient to generate double-digit percentage point ranges of uncertainty about the variables true
marginal e¤ect on the probability of using health services in a month.
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questions about the reliability of self-reported food insecurity status. In the absence of strong (and
untestable) assumptions on counterfactual outcomes and the reporting error process, we cannot fully
identify the impact of food security on health. Nevertheless, we can provide informative bounds on
these impacts using relatively weak nonparametric assumptions. Our analysis applies and extends
recent partial identication bounding methods that allow researchers to consider relatively weak
nonparametric assumptions (see, e.g., Manski, 1995; Molinari, 2008 and forthcoming; Kreider and
Pepper, 2007; Gundersen and Kreider, 2008; Kreider and Hill, 2009; and Kreider et al., 2009). Using
these methods, coupled with data from the 2001-2006 National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES), we assess the impact of food insecurity on the health of children. We focus on
two key measures studied in previous work: a childs general health status and obesity status.
In the next section, we describe the central variables of interest in this paper food insecurity,
general health outcomes, and obesity  followed by a description of the 2001-2006 NHANES. In
Section 3, we highlight the statistical identication problems created by selection issues and the
potential unreliability of self-reported food insecurity. We then show how the average treatment
e¤ects of interest can be partially identied under various assumptions about the classication error
and selection processes. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Concepts and Data
2.1 Food Insecurity
The extent of food insecurity in the United States has become a well-publicized issue of concern
to policymakers and program administrators. In 2007, 11:1% of the U.S. population reported that
they su¤ered from food insecurity at some time during the previous year (Nord et al., 2008). These
households were uncertain of having, or unable to acquire, enough food for all their members because
they had insu¢ cient money or other resources. For about 4:1% of the population, the degree of
food insecurity was severe enough to be recorded as very low food security. For households with
children, the reported levels were higher: 15:8% and 4:7%, respectively. As with other determinants
of health status (e.g., having health insurance), food insecurity status depends on the ability to
a¤ord adequate amounts of food. In 2007, households with incomes below 185% of the poverty
line had food insecurity rates over ve times higher than those with incomes below this threshold
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(Nord et al., 2008; Table 2). Food insecurity is often related to nonpecuniary factors as well, such
as nancial management skills and nutrition knowledge.
These o¢ cial food insecurity rates, dened over a 12 month period, are calculated based on
householdsresponses to a series of 18 questions posed in the Core Food Security Module (CFSM)
for families with children.2 Each question is designed to capture some aspect of food insecurity
and, for some questions, the frequency with which it manifests itself. Examples include I worried
whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more (the least severe outcome);
Did you or the other adults in your household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because
there wasnt enough money for food? and Did a child in the household ever not eat for a full
day because you couldnt a¤ord enough food?(the most severe outcome). A complete listing of
the food insecurity questions is presented in Table 1.3 Following o¢ cial denitions, we classify a
household with children as food insecure if it responds a¢ rmatively to three or more questions in
the CFSM; otherwise, it classied as food secure. We also consider two other measures of food
insecurity, both detailed in the annual report on food insecurity in the United States (Nord et al.,
2008). The rst classies a household as food insecure with hunger (called very low food security
since 2006) if it responds a¢ rmatively to eight or more of the questions. The second classies a
household as marginally food secure (or at risk of food insecurity) if it responds a¢ rmatively to
at least one question. Our primary analysis employs the standard food insecurity measure, but we
consider the other two thresholds in ancillary sensitivity analysis.
Central to this paper is the possibility that food insecurity is mismeasured in household sur-
veys. Beyond the issues raised above, Gundersen and Kreider (2008) provide evidence that some
households do not answer the CFSM questions consistently. They exploit the ordered nature of the
food insecurity questions and nd at least one inconsistency for 6:1% of the sample.4 Of course, the
presence or absence of such inconsistencies cannot by itself determine the reliability of a households
aggregate food insecurity classication. The presence of inconsistencies is not necessarily pivotal in
determining the aggregate classication, and food insecurity can be misclassied even if the house-
2For families without children and for one-person households, a subset of 10 questions are posed.
3Responses to individual questions from the CFSM are suppressed for condentiality reasons in the NHANES.
To see prevalence rates for a similar sample from the Current Population Survey, see Gundersen and Kreider (2008).
4For example, it would be expected that if a household responded a¢ rmatively to Child skipped meal due to
lack of money (item 16 in Table 1), the respondent should also respond a¢ rmatively to Child was hungry (item
14) and to Child not eating enough(item 9).
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hold always reports consistently. Still, the signicant fraction of inconsistencies provides one source
of concern even prior to considering the other aforementioned sources of potential measurement
error.
2.2 Health Outcomes
2.2.1 Childhood Obesity
Approximately 17:1% of children in the U.S. between the ages of 2 and 19 years are classied
as obese, and another 16:5% are overweight (Ogden et al., 2006). This prevalence has increased
threefold for children since 1970 (Wang and Zhang, 2006). Childhood obesity is thought to have
negative physical, psychological, and social consequences that have current and future implications
(e.g., Schwimmer et al., 2003; Carroll et al., 2007; Bender et al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2007) including
reduced life expectancy (Fontaine et al., 2003). As such, childhood obesity is of great interest to
policymakers.
The research on the relationship between food insecurity and childhood obesity is mixed. Some
have found a positive relationship (Dubois et al., 2006; Casey et al., 2001; Jyoti et al., 2005; Casey
et al. 2006), others have found no relationship (Alaimo et al., 2001b; Kaiser et al., 2002; Martin
and Ferris, 2007; Gundersen et al., 2008; Bhargava et al., 2008; Gundersen et al., 2009), and others
have found a negative relationship (Jimenez-Cruz et al., 2003; Rose and Bodor, 2006; Matheson et
al., 2002). This work has used a variety of data sets and methods. In common to these papers is
an assumption that reports of food insecurity are classied accurately.
In this paper, we divide childhood weight status into two categories: (1) healthy weight and
(2) overweight or obese.5 A child is in the former category if his or her body mass index (BMI)
(kg=m2) falls below the 85th percentile for age and gender and in the latter category otherwise.
These percentiles were established by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In
ancillary analyses we compare children who are obese (i.e., at or above the 95th percentile for BMI)
with children who are overweight (but not obese) or healthy weight.
5These are the designations provided by the American Academy of Pediatrics. Other terms for these categories
are also used. A small number of children fall in the underweight category with BMIs under the 5th percentile. We
include them in the healthy weight category, but our results are robust to whether they are included or omitted from
the analyses.
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2.2.2 General Health
Our second health outcome is the general health of the child as reported by the mother. This
measure has been widely used as a measure of child health (e.g., Case et al., 2002; Currie et
al., 2007; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Dowd, 2007; Murasko, 2008). Its use is due, in part, to
its correlation with other current and future health outcomes (e.g., Case et al., 2002; Idler and
Kasl, 1995; Idler and Bensymini, 1997; Van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003) including some of the
outcomes associated with food insecurity in the studies noted above.
Based on parents responses, a childs health using this measure is categorized as excellent,
very good, good, fair, or poor. In this paper, we combine these general health categories into
two categories: (1) excellent, very good, or good and (2) fair or poor. The former we call good
health or better. In the ancillary analyses, we consider two di¤erent comparisons: excellent health
compared with the remaining categories and very good or excellent health compared with the
remaining categories.
2.3 Data
Our analysis uses data from the 2001-2006 NHANES. The NHANES, conducted by the National
Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control (NCHS/CDC), is a program of studies
designed to assess the health and nutritional status of adults and children in the U.S. through
interviews and direct physical examinations. The survey now examines a nationally representative
sample of about 5,000 persons each year, about half of whom are children. The interview includes
demographic, socioeconomic, dietary, and health-related questions with components consisting of
medical and dental examinations, physiological measurements, and laboratory tests. Of particular
relevance to this study, food insecurity is calculated using the full set of questions in the CFSM as
described above,6 the childs height and weight were measured with an automated data-collection
system by a trained technician in the NHANES mobile examination center, and the childs general
health is based on parental reports. Since food insecurity is rare among households above 200%
of the poverty line (Nord et al., 2008), we limit our sample to households with incomes below this
threshold. Our sample contains 6; 056 children.
6For condentiality reasons, however, the responses to individual questions are suppressed in the NHANES data.
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3 Identication
The central goal of this paper is to learn about the e¤ect of food security on (a) whether a child is in
good or better health and (b) whether a child is a healthy weight. Our treatment e¤ects approach
considers the following thought experiment: To what extent might expected health outcomes di¤er
under a hypothetical treatment that would make food insecure households food secure, without
the treatment a¤ecting health status through other avenues? To this end, we consider what can be
known about the Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE),
ATE = P [H(FS = 1) = 1]  P [H(FS = 0) = 1], (1)
under various assumptions, where H = 1 denotes a good health outcome (e.g., the child is a
healthy weight), FS = 1 if a child is truly food secure,7 and FS = 0 if a child is truly food
insecure. The ATE reveals how the mean health outcome would di¤er if all low-income children
were food secure versus the mean outcome if all low-income children were food insecure. Instead of
observing FS, we observe a self-reported counterpart FS. A latent variable Z indicates whether
a report is accurate: Z = 1 if FS = FS, with Z = 0 otherwise. In the absence of measurement
error, FS can be replaced with FS.8
Two forms of uncertainty arise when one assesses the ATE. First, even if FS were observed for
all children (i.e., there were no conceptual or practical measurement issues), the outcome H(1) is
counterfactual for all children who were food insecure. Similarly, the outcomeH(0) is counterfactual
for all children who were food secure. A statistical selectionproblem arises in that households
become food secure or food insecure based in part on factors unobserved to the researcher. Thus,
for example, the mean health outcomes of the currently food insecure, should they become food
secure, may not reect the mean health outcomes of the currently food secure. Second, true food
insecurity status is not observed. Even if all households respond accurately to survey questions,
the state of being food insecure is conceptually di¢ cult to measure. We refer to this issue as the
7Food insecurity is dened at the household level but, for simplicity of exposition, we refer to a child being food
secure or food insecure.
8For ease of notation, we leave implicit any conditioning variables. We focus on bounding treatment e¤ects for the
population of low-income households with children as a whole, but it is straightforward to condition on any observed
subpopulations of interest. One might loosely interpret H(FS) as a reduced form health production function, though
our approach does not require that we condition on other attributes. Note that we are not estimating a regression,
and there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be satised.
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classication error problem.9 Existing research on the e¤ects of food security on health outcomes
has not addressed either of these identication problems. In what follows, we rst focus on the
selection problem and then assess the additional uncertainty created by potentially misclassied
food insecurity status.10
3.1 Selection
To illustrate the selection problem, the rst component of Equation (1) can be written as:
P [H(1) = 1] = P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1]P (FS = 1) + P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0]P (FS = 0) (2)
where we denote H(1)  H(FS = 1) and H(0)  H(FS = 0). For the moment, assume that
reports of food security are known to be accurate such that FS is observed. In this case, we
can identify P (FS = 1) and P (FS = 0), the fractions of children who are food secure and food
insecure, respectively, and P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1], the probability of a favorable health outcome for
food secure children. What is not identied, however, is the counterfactual probability of a favorable
health outcome for food insecure children if they were to become food secure, P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0].
Absent other information, this value could lie anywhere between 0 and 1. Taking these extreme
cases, we can bound Equation (2) as follows:
P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1]P (FS = 1)
 P [H(1) = 1]  P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1]P (FS = 1) + P (FS = 0)
which reduces to
P (H = 1; FS = 1)  P [H(1) = 1]  P (H = 1; FS = 1) + P (FS = 0)
9O¢ cial statistics treat food insecurity as a binary event (e.g., Nord et al., 2008), and virtually the entire literature
has treated food insecurity in the manner (exceptions include Gundersen (2008) and Gundersen et al. (2003)). As
noted above, responses to individual questions in the CFSM component of the NHANES are not available due to
condentiality concerns. For these reassons, and because our approach does not lend itself to continuous treatments,
we follow the vast majority of the food insecurity literature in treating food insecurity status as binary. We do,
however, consider alternative indicators of food insecurity as part of the sensitivity analysis.
10Using numerical search methods, our results can be generalized to cases where H is also measured with error. In
that case, our identied treatment e¤ect bounds would naturally become wider.
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using P [H(FS = j) = 1jFS = j] = P (H = jjFS = j) for j = 1; 0.
Each of the terms in these bounds is identied by the observed data. We can analogously bound
the quantity P [H(0) = 1]. Taking the di¤erence between the upper bound on P [H(1) = 1] and the
lower bound on P [H(0) = 1] obtains a sharp upper bound on ATE, and analogously a sharp lower
bound (Manski, 1995):
P (H = 1; FS = 1)  P (H = 1; FS = 0)  P (FS = 1) (3)
 ATEManski 
P (H = 1; FS = 1)  P (H = 1; FS = 0) + P (FS = 0) .
These bounds have a width of 1. To obtain these bounds, Manski (1995) presumes that all vari-
ables are measured accurately. Condence intervals around ATE can be computed using methods
developed in Imbens and Manski (2004).
The bounds in Equation (3) can be narrowed by making assumptions about the relationship
between food security and health outcomes. Under the strong assumption that selection is exoge-
nous, for example, one can point-identify P [H(FS = j) = 1] as equal to P (H = 1jFS = j) for
j = 1; 0 (see Equation (2)) since, by exogeneity, P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0] = P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1]. In
this case, the average treatment e¤ect is identied as
ATEExogenous = P (H = 1jFS = 1)  P (H = 1jFS = 0) , (4)
an observed quantity in the absence of measurement error since, in that case, FS is observed.
In lieu of the exogeneity assumption, we consider the identifying power of various combina-
tions of three types of weaker monotonicity assumptions: monotone treatment response (MTR),
monotone treatment selection (MTS), and a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) restriction. We
discuss each assumption in turn.
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3.1.1 Monotone Treatment Response (MTR)
For the parts of our analysis that impose MTR, we assume that becoming food secure would not
lead to a reduction in a childs health status. Formally, we assume:
H(FSi = 1)  H(FSi = 0) for all i
where i denotes the particular child. Under this assumption, it is readily apparent that ATE is
constrained to be nonnegative. Using the law of total probability, it can also be shown that
P [H(0) = 1]  P (H = 1)  P [H(1) = 1]:
For the general health outcome, the MTR assumption seems relatively innocuous. At least in
the short run, it is di¢ cult to imagine how becoming food secure would lead to worsened general
childrens health. With respect to the healthy weight outcome, the MTR assumption is perhaps
more tenuous because potential increases in caloric intake could result in weight gains. Of course,
most increases in weight are not associated with obesity, and the previous literature has found that
food insecurity can lead to higher probabilities of being overweight due to (1) overconsumption
of cheaper, energy-dense foods (Dietz, 1995; Drewnowski and Specter, 2004), (2) overeating when
food is more plentiful (Scheier, 2005), (3) metabolic changes to ensure a more e¢ cient use of energy
(Alaimo et al., 2001b), and (4) parents protecting their children by giving them more food than
needed when food is available (McIntyre et al., 2003). In such instances, becoming food secure
decreases the likelihood of childhood obesity. Still, the potential that becoming food secure could
lead to increases in a childs weight leaves open the possibility that becoming food secure could
lead to weight problems in the short run and poorer general health outcomes in the long run. We
impose the MTR assumption in deriving our baseline results, but we make transparent how the
results vary when the assumption is discarded.
3.1.2 Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS)
The MTS assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000) places structure on the selection mechanism
through which children become food secure or insecure. The literature on food security suggests that
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food secure children are advantaged compared with food insecure children across several economic
and demographic characteristics (Nord et al., 2008). These characteristics are associated with better
health outcomes with respect to both general health (Case et al., 2002; Currie et al., 2007; Currie
and Stabile, 2003; Dowd, 2007; Murasko, 2008) and obesity (McKay et al., 2008; Forshee et al.,
2004; Van Hook and Stamper Balistreri, 2007). Suppose that children who are food secure under the
status quo would be more likely to be healthy, relative to their currently food insecure counterparts,
conditional on the food security treatment. In that case, the following MTS restrictions hold:
P [H(FS = j) = 1jFS = 1]  P [H(FS = j) = 1jFS = 0] for j = 1; 0.
Under the MTS assumption, it can be shown that
P [H(1) = 1]  P (H = 1jFS = 1)
and
P [H(0) = 1]  P (H = 1jFS = 0).
If FS is observed, then the right-hand-side quantities P (H = 1jFS = 1) and P (H = 1jFS = 0)
are known. If instead FS is measured with error, then bounds on P (H = 1jFS = 1) and
P (H = 1jFS = 0), derived below, serve as bounds on, respectively, P [H(1) = 1] and P [H(0) = 1].
3.1.3 Monotone Instrumental Variables (MIV)
Finally, we consider the identifying power of a monotone instrumental variables (MIV) assump-
tion rst analyzed by Manski and Pepper (2000). In our application, we use the CPS-dened
income-to-povertyratio as the monotone instrument. This ratio measures a households income
relative to the o¢ cial poverty line. Under the MIV assumption, we impose the restriction that
the probability of being healthy conditional on food security status is weakly larger for children
in higher-income households than in lower-income households. Letting v represent the instrument,
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the MIV assumption implies the following inequalities:11
u1  u  u2 =) P [H(FS = j) = 1jv = u1] (5)
 P [H(FS = j) = 1jv = u]  P [H(FS = j) = 1jv = u2] for j = 1; 0.
As noted above, the literature on general health outcomes and childhood obesity has demonstrated
that people with higher incomes tend to have better health outcomes. This mean monotonicity
condition in Equation (5) is weaker than the standard mean independence instrumental variables
(IV) assumption. Under mean independence, the inequalities in Equation (5) would be replaced
with equalities. It is di¢ cult to nd instruments for food insecurity status that would satisfy mean
independence, so we impose the weaker MIV assumption that has less identifying power. Unlike
the standard IV assumption, the MIV assumption does not imply any exclusion restriction; the
mean health outcome is allowed to vary (monotonically) with income though avenues distinct from
the impact of income on food security.
Across 12 ordered income categories (about 500 children per group), the estimation procedure
enforces a restriction that any derived lower bound on P [H(FS = j) = 1] (based on the particular
set of other maintained assumptions) for a higher income group must be no smaller than the lower
bound derived for a lower income group. Similarly, any derived upper bound on P [H(FS = j) = 1]
for a lower income group must be no larger than the upper bound derived for a higher income group.
Estimation details are provided in Kreider and Pepper (2007) where they derive an estimator that
accounts for nite sample bias in Manski and Peppers (2000) standard MIV estimator.12 In
other applications, the MIV assumption has been e¤ective in substantially narrowing the range of
uncertainty about treatment e¤ects (e.g., Kreider and Hill, 2009).
3.2 Bounding the ATE in the Presence of Classication Error
Given the selection problem, the average treatment e¤ect cannot be identied based on the data
alone. Even if the relevant variables were known to be measured accurately, the presence of unknown
counterfactuals precludes point identication; ATE can only be bounded. When we also allow for
11Under the MTS assumption, the treatment FS is itself an MIV.
12As discussed by Manski and Pepper (2000), their standard estimator is consistent but biased in nite samples.
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classication errors in reported food security status, the bounds naturally widen. In this section,
we show how to bound ATE under various assumptions about the selection process and about the
nature and degree of classication error.
3.2.1 Exogenous selection
We begin with the special case of exogenous selection into food security status using Equation
(4). In this case, we are abstracting away from uncertainty about counterfactuals; all identication
uncertainty comes from uncertainty about the measurement of FS. To assess the impact of
classication error in this exogenous selection setting, we draw from the approach in Gundersen
and Kreider (2008). Let +1  P (H = 1; FS = 1; Z = 0) and  1  P (H = 1; FS = 0; Z = 0)
denote the unobserved fraction of false positive and false negative food security reports, respectively,
among healthy children. Let +0  P (H = 0; FS = 1; Z = 0) and  0  P (H = 0; FS = 0; Z = 0)
denote the fraction of false positive and false negative food security reports, respectively, among
non-healthy children.
Before considering any structure on the pattern of false positives and false negatives, we begin
by assessing identication given a limit on the potential degree of misclassication. Following
Horowitz and Manski (1995) and much of the subsequent literature, we can study how identication
of unknown parameters varies with the condence in the data. Consider an upper bound, q, on the
fraction of inaccurate food security classications:
(i) P (Z = 0)  +1 + +0 +  1 +  0  q. (6)
This assumption incorporates a researchers beliefs about the potential degree of data corrup-
tion. If q equals 0 (as is implicitly assumed in all previous work on relationships between food
security and health outcomes), then P (H = 1jFS) is point-identied because all food security
reports are assumed to be accurate. At the opposite extreme, a researcher unwilling to place any
limit on the potential degree of reporting error can set q equal to 1. In that case, there is no hope
of learning anything about P (H = 1jFS) without constraining the pattern of reporting errors. In
any event, the sensitivity of inferences on P (H = 1jFS) can be examined by varying the value of
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q between 0 and 1. To illustrate identication decay in the presence of even small amounts of food
security classication errors, our empirical analysis focuses on values of q between 0 and 0:05.
Regardless of any subsequent assumptions on the pattern of reporting errors, the following
constraints must hold:
(ii) 0  +1  P (H = 1; FS = 1)  p11
(iii) 0  +0  P (H = 0; FS = 1)  p01
(iv) 0   1  P (H = 1; FS = 0)  p10
(v) 0   0  P (H = 0; FS = 0)  p00.
For example, the fraction of children experiencing negative health outcomes in households falsely
classied as being food secure obviously cannot exceed the fraction of children experiencing negative
health outcomes in households classied as being food secure.
Worst-case bounds on P (H = 1jFS) can be obtained by nding the extrema subject to the
restrictions on +1 , 
+
0 , 
 
1 , and 
 
0 provided in constraints (i)-(v). Let p  P (FS = 1) be the
reported food security rate. In the absence of further assumptions, we obtain the following sharp
corrupt sampling (arbitrary error) bounds on P (H = 1jFS) derived by Kreider and Pepper
(2007) in another context:13
Corrupt Sampling Bounds With Exogenous Selection (Kreider-Pepper, 2007, Prop. 1):
Let P (Z = 0)  q. Under exogenous selection, the fraction of positive health outcomes if all
children were to become food secure is bounded sharply as follows:
p11   +
p  2+ + q  P (H = 1jFS
 = 1)  p11 + 
 
p+ 2    q
using the values
+ =
8><>:
min fq; p11g if p11   p01   q  0
max f0; q   p00g otherwise
13Corrupt sampling refers to an environment where nothing is known about the pattern of reporting errors.
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  =
8><>:
min fq; p10g if p11   p01 + q  0
max f0; q   p01g otherwise.
Analogous bounds for the fraction of positive health outcomes among food insecure children, P (H =
1jFS = 0), are obtained by replacing FS = 1 with FS = 0 and vice versa in each of the relevant
quantities. Sharp bounds on ATEExogenous are obtained by subtracting worst-case lower bounds
from worst-case upper bounds on P (H = 1jFS = 1) and P (H = 1jFS = 0). Intuitively, the
bounds converge to P (H = 1jFS = 1) as q goes to 0. Increasing q may widen the bounds over
some ranges of q but not others, and the rate of identication decay can be highly nonlinear as q
increases (especially for larger values of q).
These corrupt sampling bounds can be narrowed, sometimes dramatically, by imposing restric-
tions on the patterns of false positives and false negatives. We focus on an orthogonal errors
assumption that food security classication errors occur independently of whether the household is
truly food secure:14
P (FS = 1jZ = 1) = P (FS = 1jZ = 0). (7)
In this case, the false positive and false negative classication errors must satisfy the constraint:
(vi)

1  p  ( 1 +  0 )
  
+1 + 
+
0

+ ( 1 + 
 
0 )

=
 
+1 + 
+
0
 
1   +1 + +0   ( 1 +  0 ) .
As revealed in our empirical results, this orthogonality assumption has substantial identifying
power. While this restriction cannot be tested, it is obviously weaker than the standard assumption
in previous work that food insecurity status is reported without error. We cannot obtain closed-
form bounds on ATE for this case, but we can obtain sharp bounds by imposing this constraint
using numerical methods.15
14Many studies have assumed that classication errors arise independently of the variables true value (see Molinari
(2008) for a discussion). Bollinger (1996), for example, discusses the possibility that a workers true union status has
no inuence on whether union status is misreported in the data. Kreider and Pepper (2008) consider the identifying
assumption that, among certain types of respondents, misreported disability status does not depend on true disability
status. Gundersen and Kreider (2008) and Kreider et al. (2009) consider a no false positivesidentifying assumption
that respondents may fail to report receiving food stamps but not falsely claim to receive food stamps.
15Our Gauss program is available upon request.
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3.2.2 Endogenous selection
When selection into food security status is endogenous, the average treatment e¤ect is no longer
constrained by the bounds in Equation (4). To derive corrupt sampling bounds for this case in the
presence of classication error, we begin by writing
P [H(1) = 1] = P [H(1) = 1jFS = 1]P (FS = 1) + P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0]P (FS = 0)
= P (H = 1jFS = 1)P (FS = 1) + P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0]P (FS = 0)
= P (H = 1; FS = 1) + P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0]P (FS = 0) .
We can set P [H(1) = 1jFS = 0] equal to 0 for the lower bound and equal to 1 for the upper bound
since this quantity is unrestricted. Then we can write
P (H = 1; FS = 1) +  1   +1  P [H(1) = 1]  P (H = 1; FS = 1) + P (FS = 0) + +0    0 .
To obtain the worst-case lower bound, we must set  1 = 0 and 
+
1 = min fq; P (H = 1; FS = 1)g.
For the worst-case upper bound, we must set  0 = 0 and 
+
0 = min fq; P (H = 0; FS = 1)g. Thus,
the corrupt sampling bounds are given by:
Corrupt Sampling Bounds With Endogenous Selection: Let P (Z = 0)  q. Under
arbitrary endogenous selection, the fraction of positive health outcomes if all children were to become
food secure is bounded sharply as follows:
LBH(1)corrupt = P (H = 1; FS = 1) min fq; P (H = 1; FS = 1)g
 P [H(1) = 1] 
UBH(1)corrupt = P (H = 1; FS = 1) + P (FS = 0) + min fq; P (H = 0; FS = 1)g .
Analogous bounds on P [H(0) = 1] are obtained by replacing FS = 1 with FS = 0 and vice versa
in each of the relevant quantities. Sharp bounds on ATE are obtained by subtracting worst-case
lower bounds from worst-case upper bounds on P [H(1) = 1] and P [H(0) = 1]. Intuitively, the
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ATE bounds with endogenous selection converge to the Manski (1995) bounds in Equation (3) as
q goes to 0.
As above, these bounds can be narrowed by imposing restrictions on the patterns of food
insecurity classication errors. Using numerical methods to impose constraint (vi), our empirical
analysis considers the case where classication errors arise independently of true food insecurity
status (i.e., under the assumption of orthogonal errors). In presenting our results, we consider the
additional identifying power of the MTR, MTS, and MIV assumptions.
4 Empirical results
We now turn to our empirical results. Figures 1-4, and their accompanying tables, illustrate what
can be known about the average treatment e¤ect as a function of q under various assumptions
about the selection process and food security misclassication patterns. One set of results focuses
on the impact of food security on general health status. A parallel set of results focus on the impact
of food security on being a healthy weight.
We begin with the case of exogenous selection into food security status. Figure 1A displays sharp
bounds on ATEExogenous = P (H = 1jFS = 1) P (H = 1jFS = 0) for the good health or better
versus fair or poor healthoutcome over the range q = 0 to q = 0:05. When q = 0:05, for example,
up to 5% of the FS classications may be in error. When q = 0, ATEExogenous is point-identied
as 0:953   0:892 = 0:061. That is, children in food secure households are 6:1 percentage points
more likely to be in good health compared with children in food insecure households. As shown in
the accompanying table, the 90% condence interval is [0:044; 0:079]. Since this condence interval
does not include 0, we can identify the sign of ATEExogenous as positive even after accounting for
sampling variability.
As revealed in the gure, however, even tiny degrees of uncertainty about true food insecurity
status are su¢ cient to overturn the conclusion that food secure children are more likely to be in
good health. Under corrupt sampling, we can no longer identify the sign of ATEExogenous (even
prior to considering standard errors) if we allow for the possibility that even 1:5% of the food
insecurity status classications are in error. Imposing the orthogonal errors assumption makes
little di¤erence. Under this restriction on the pattern of errors, we still cannot identify whether
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food secure children are more likely to be healthy if up to 2:1% of the classications may be in
error.
Starting at q = 0, a one percentage point increase in the degree of uncertainty about the
reliability of food insecurity classications (increase in q), given orthogonal errors, is associated
with an additional 8:2 percentage point increase in uncertainty about ATEExogenous. By the time
we allow for the possibility of a 5% error rate, we nd that children in food secure households
may be up to 14:2 percentage points more likely to be in good health than their food insecure
counterparts under orthogonal errors or they may be up to 9:0 percentage points less likely to
be in good health. This 23:2 percentage point range of uncertainty about the ATE is striking,
especially since it abstracts away from additional uncertainty associated with sampling variability,
the selection mechanism, and the possibility that health status might also be mismeasured. Very
small degrees of food security classication errors can result in severe degrees of uncertainty about
the relationships between food security and health.
Figure 1B presents parallel results for the healthy weight outcome. In the absence of classica-
tion error (q = 0), we can identify that food secure children are 4:6 percentage points more likely
to have a healthy weight (0:683 0:636 = 0:046). Critical values for q are similar to those identied
for the general health case above. If food insecurity status might be arbitrarily misclassied up to
1:5% of the time, then we can no longer identify whether food secure or food insecure children are
more likely to have a healthy weight. Under the orthogonal errors assumptions, the critical value
rises only slightly to 1:9%.
Figures 2A and 2B make clear how little can be known about the average treatment e¤ect when
we impose no restrictions on the nature of the selection process into food secure status. Even if
we presume perfectly accurate measurement of the data, we are confronted with a 100 percentage
point range of uncertainty about the average treatment e¤ect (see Equation (3) and discussion):
ATE could lie anywhere within [ 0:329; 0:671] for the general health outcome and anywhere within
[ 0:424; 0:576] for the healthy weight outcome.
Similarly, little can be known about the fraction of households that would be healthy if all
children became food secure, P [H(1) = 1], without making assumptions about the food security
selection process. Ignoring measurement error, 93% of the households in our sample are classied as
being in good or better health. If all children were to become food secure, the proportion of children
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in good or better health could lie anywhere between 63:4% and 96:9% (not shown). Likewise, little
can be known about the fraction of respondents that would have a healthy weight. In the data, 67%
are classied as being a healthy weight; if all children were to become food secure, this outcome
could range from 45:5% to 78:9%.
To make tighter inferences about P [H(1) = 1] and ATE, stronger assumptions must be imposed.
As seen in Figure 3, the bounds on ATE narrow dramatically after imposing the MTR and MTS
monotonicity assumptions. When q = 0, the fraction of households that would be healthy if all
children were food secure, P [H(1) = 1], is conned to lie within the narrow range [0:933; 0:953]
(not shown). As seen in Figure 3A, the range of ATE narrows to [0; 0:061]. For healthy weight,
P [H(1) = 1] is conned to the narrow range [0:667; 0:683] (not shown). As seen in Figure 3B, ATE
lies within the range [0; 0:046]. That is, children would be up to 6:1 percentage points more likely
to be healthy if all children were food secure versus if all children were food insecure. Similarly,
children would be up to 4:6 percentage points more likely to have a healthy weight if children were
to become food secure.
After allowing for possible classication errors in food security status, the potential for strong
positive e¤ects of food security on health rises substantially. For example, Figure 3A shows that
the upper bound on ATE for good health rises to 14:2 percentage points under orthogonal errors,
and 19:4 points under arbitrary errors, if even 5% of the food insecurity classications may be
inaccurate. Thus, our results reveal that e¤orts to limit uncertainty about the reliability of food
insecurity data can have important consequences for limiting uncertainty about the e¤ects of food
security on health status. If we impose the MTS assumption but discard the MTR assumption, the
upper bounds in Figure 3 would remain the same but the lower bounds would fall to the Figure 2
lower bounds.
We now turn to the case when we combine the MTR-MTS assumptions with the MIV assump-
tion. In this case, the average treatment e¤ects are identied to be strictly positive. Recall that
the MIV assumption imposes the restriction that, on average, health status does not decline with a
familys income-to-poverty ratio. The no MIV LBand no MIV UBbounds depicted in Figure
4 reproduce the Figure 3 bounds. The MIV bounds tighten these inferences. As seen in Figure 4A,
the joint MTR-MTS-MIV assumption allows us to nearly point-identify the general health ATE if
the food security classications are known to be fully reliable. Specically, ATE is bounded to lie
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in the narrow range [0:014; 0:035] when q = 0. For the healthy weight outcome, ATE is bounded to
lie within the range [0:007; 0:039]. In both cases, policies that promote food security are identied
to promote better health outcomes. When q increases from 0 to 0:05, the upper bound on the
average treatment e¤ect for good general health status rises from 0:035 to 0:109, while the lower
bound remains constant at 0:014. For healthy weight, the upper bound rises from 0:039 to 0:174
while the lower bound remains constant at 0:007. If we drop the MTR assumption for the general
health outcome, the lower bound ranges from  0:307 when q = 0 to  0:358 when q = 0:05 (not
shown). If we drop this assumption for the healthy weight outcome, the lower bound ranges from
 0:424 when q = 0 to  0:474 when q = 0:05.
In Appendix Tables 1 and 2, we assess the robustness of our primary results to alternative
constructions of the health indicators (di¤erent rows) and food insecurity indicators (di¤erent
columns). For the general health outcome, we replace the threshold at least good healthwith the
alternatives at least very good healthand excellent health.For the healthy weight outcome,
we replace the threshold BMI  85th percentile(representing not overweight or obese) with the
alternative BMI  95th percentile (not obese). Recall from Section 2.1 that the standard food
insecurity indicator classies a household as food insecure if the household answers a¢ rmatively to
three or more questions in the 18-item CFSM. In the sensitivity analysis, we consider an indicator of
food insecure or at risk(also termed marginal food insecurityin the literature) and an indicator
of food insecurity with hunger (since 2006 called very low food security). A household with
children is classied as food insecure or at risk if it answers a¢ rmatively to at least one of the
18 questions. A household is classied as food insecure with hunger if it responds a¢ rmatively to
eight or more of the 18 questions.
As seen in Appendix Table 1, the main conclusions from Figure 1 are robust to these alternative
measures. While the estimated values of  are naturally sensitive to the particular denitions
(baseline cases in bold), the table reveals that identication of this parameter decays rapidly with
q in all cases. Critical values for q in which the sign of  is just identied vary between 0:003
and 0:075. Thus, under any set of denitions, the sign of  cannot be identied if more than 7:5
percent of the food insecurity classications may be in error.
Appendix Table 2 displays our sensitivity analysis for the average treatment e¤ect bounds
illustrated in Figure 4. The main conclusion from this table is that we can continue to identify
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ATE as strictly positive in most cases under the joint MTR-MTS-MIV assumption, at least for
small degrees of food insecurity classication error. As an exception, we cannot identify ATE as
strictly positive if the threshold is excellent general health. Also, we cannot identify a strictly
positive e¤ect for the baseline healthy weight outcome (BMI  85th percentile) under the food
insecurity with hunger criterion. As before, the lower bound impacts of food security on health
outcomes are relatively uninformative if the MTR assumption is discarded.
Our results demonstrate that uncertainty about the reliability of FS does not necessarily
translate into symmetric uncertainty for policymakers regarding the e¢ cacy of improving food
insecurity in promoting good health. Once we allow for the possibility of data errors in FS
(q > 0), we nd that the true impacts of food security on health outcomes may be considerably
larger than would be estimated under the assumption of perfectly accurate data (q = 0). Conversely,
our baseline results suggest that there is relatively little risk that researchers have overestimated
the magnitudes of these health impacts.
This conclusion for policymakers is qualitatively consistent with the well-known attenuation
bias result associated with classical measurement error in an explanatory variable.16 In the context
of the classical model, random mismeasurement of FS in a regression setting would result in a
downward-biased estimate of food security on health due to negative correlation between reported
food security status and the stochastic regression disturbance. In that case, the attenuation result
would be driven by the strong nondi¤erential errorsindependence assumption embedded in the
classical model that, conditional on FS, any measurement error in FS must be independent of
health status, other conditioning variables of interest, and the regression disturbance. We obtain
a similar attenuation result without imposing any of the parametric or distributional assumptions
associated with the classical measurement error regression model.
5 Conclusion
Policymakers have long been concerned about the well-being of millions of children who grow up
in food insecure households. Much of this concern arises from well-documented links between
food insecurity and unfavorable health outcomes. In response, numerous e¤orts (e.g., SNAP) have
16See, e.g., Wooldridge (2002, chapter 4).
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been pursued with the goal of ensuring that all children live in food secure homes. While there
is little debate that food secure children tend to have more favorable health outcomes, identifying
the causal impacts of food security on health is problematic. Food insecurity is obviously not
randomly assigned. Many household characteristics, including those unobserved in the data, might
lead some children to be simultaneously at higher risk of being food insecure and of having poor
health outcomes. Moreover, the potential for conceptual and practical errors in the measurement
of food insecurity exacerbates a policymakers uncertainty about the e¢ cacy of food assistance
programs in fostering better health outcomes. Previous analyses of the role of food security for
healthy outcomes have not addressed either of these important identication issues.
In this paper, we used nonparametric bounding methods to reconsider what can be identied
about causal e¤ects of food security on childrens health outcomes. We formally accounted for
the uncertainty created by unobserved counterfactuals and potentially mismeasured food insecurity
status. Even under the strong and implausible assumption of exogenous selection, we illustrate how
the presence of very small degrees of classication error in food security status can be su¢ cient to
lose identication of the sign of the average treatment e¤ect. Under relatively weak monotonicity
assumptions, however, we can identify that food security has a statistically signicant positive
impact on childrens general health status, even with endogenous food security status.
We show that uncertainty about the reliability of the food security data need not translate into
symmetric uncertainty for policymakers regarding the impact of food security on health outcomes.
Under the monotonicity assumptions, we nd that allowing for the possibility of food security clas-
sication errors opens up the possibility that the true impacts of food security on health outcomes
may be considerably larger than estimated under the standard assumption of no errors. Con-
versely, there appears to be relatively little risk that researchers have systematically overestimated
the magnitudes of these health impacts. A qualitatively similar attenuation bias result could be
derived using classical measurement error assumptions. Unlike the classical model, however, our
methods do not presume that measurement error is exogenous. Instead, we allow for the possibility
that classication errors are endogenously related to the true value of the potentially mismeasured
food security variable or the health outcomes.
We suggest several areas for future research. First, the bounds in this analysis might be narrowed
by imposing additional identifying assumptions. As one possibility, researchers might be willing
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to assume that at least some subset of the food security classications are known to be accurate.
For example, one might be willing to verifythat a household is truly food secure if it responds
negatively to all 18 of the relevant food security questions in the CFSM. Similarly, a household
might be veried to be food insecure if responding a¢ rmatively to a large number of questions.
Second, future research on the mechanisms through which food security a¤ects health outcomes is
warranted. Of particular import is disentangling the short- and long-run e¤ects of becoming food
secure. Third, our analysis has presumed that health outcomes are accurately reported. While
the height and weight status of children in the NHANES are objectively measured by trained
personnel, the general health outcome relies on more subjective interpretations. The bounds in
this analysis naturally widen if we allow for the possibility that both food security and health
status are misclassied.
Finally, we emphasize that our analysis is intended to isolate the impact of food security on
health, not the impact of program participation on health. Therefore, our analysis cannot directly
identify the health consequences of programs designed to alleviate food insecurity, like SNAP.
Not everyone who enrolls in a program like SNAP becomes food secure, and any program that
provides transfers (or manipulates prices) has the potential to impact health status through avenues
distinct from the programs e¤ect on food security. SNAP benets, for example, free up some of a
households resources that might have been spent on food. If some of these freed resources are spent
on medical services, then the program can also impact health status through the consumption of
more health care thus reinforcing the positive impact on health. Further research is required on
a program-by-program basis to identify the health consequences of particular policies.
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Table 1.  
Food Insecurity Questions in the Core Food Security Module 
 
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 
12 months? 
4. “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we were running out of 
money to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
5. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of your meals or skip 
meals because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
6. “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
7. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn’t enough money 
for food? (Yes/No) 
8. (If yes to Question 5) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
9. “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food.”  Was that often, 
sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
10. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because you couldn’t afford enough food? 
(Yes/No) 
11. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because you didn’t have enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
12. In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there wasn’t 
enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
13. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a whole day because 
there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No) 
14. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food? (Yes/No) 
15. (If yes to Question 13) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there wasn’t enough money for 
food? (Yes/No) 
17. (If yes to Question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but not every 
month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
18. In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough 
money for food? (Yes/No) 
Notes:  Responses in bold indicate an affirmative response. 
Figure 1A 
 
Sharp Bounds on the Difference in the Probability of Being in Good or Better Health 
Between Food Secure and Food Insecure Children under Exogenous Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Δ = P(good or better health| food secure) 
       − P(good health or better| food insecure) 
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    q = 0.05 [-0.097, 0.194]        [-0.090, 0.142] 
                  [-0.104  0.207]        [-0.101  0.156] 
      
            
  
 
 
† Point estimates of the population bounds 
‡ Imbens-Manski (2004) 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
Figure 1B 
 
Sharp Bounds on the Difference in the Probability of BMI ≤ 85th Percentile Between 
Food Secure and Food Insecure Children under Exogenous Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Δ = P(BMI ≤ 85th Percentile| food secure) 
       − P(healthy weight| food insecure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Arbitrary Errors        Orthogonal Errors 
    q = 0        [ 0.046, 0.046]†     [ 0.046, 0.046]       
                  [ 0.016  0.077]‡      [ 0.016  0.077]       
 
    q = 0.01  [ 0.017, 0.075]        [ 0.021, 0.067]       
                  [-0.008  0.099]        [-0.002  0.091]    
 
    q = 0.05      [-0.113, 0.185]        [-0.082, 0.149]         
                  [-0.140  0.207]        [-0.107  0.174] 
     
            
 
a. “Healthy weight” is defined as having a body mass index below the 85th BMI percentile. 
  
 
 
0.0463 
UB under orthogonal errors 
LB under arbitrary errors 
                      q 
(maximum allowed degree of  
 food security misclassification) 
UB under arbitrary errors 
LB under orthogonal errors 
0.015 0.019
† Point estimates of the population bounds 
‡ Imbens-Manski (2004) 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
Figure 2 
 
Sharp Bounds on ATE = P[H(1)=1] − P[H(0)=1] with No Monotonicity Assumptions 
 
 
                       A. Probability of Being in Good or Better Health                    B. Probability of BMI ≤ 85th Percentile 
 
 
 
 
 arbitrary errors 
orthogonal errors 
 
 arbitrary errors 
orthogonal errors 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  q  q 
                                               
                        Arbitrary Errors     Orthogonal Errors                    Arbitrary Errors  Orthogonal Errors 
      q = 0       [-0.329, 0.671]†   [-0.329, 0.671]                      q = 0   [-0.424, 0.576]   [-0.424, 0.576] 
                       [-0.340  0.681]‡    [-0.340  0.681]                     [-0.436  0.588]     [-0.446  0.586] 
 
          q = 0.01 [-0.349, 0.691]   [-0.339, 0.681]                   q = 0.01  [-0.444, 0.596]   [-0.434, 0.586] 
                        [-0.360  0.701]   [-0.349  0.691]                    [-0.456  0.608]   [-0.446  0.598] 
 
          q = 0.05    [-0.415, 0.752]   [-0.379, 0.721]                 q = 0.05   [-0.524, 0.676]   [-0.474, 0.626] 
                       [-0.426  0.762]   [-0.390  0.731]                     [-0.536  0.688]   [-0.486  0.638] 
 
 
† Point estimates of the population bounds; ‡ Imbens-Manski (2004) 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
Figure 3 
 
Sharp Bounds on ATE = P[H(1)=1] − P[H(0)=1] with MTR and MTS Assumptions 
 
 
                  A. Probability of Being in Good or Better Health                  B. Probability of BMI ≤ 85th Percentile 
  
 
 
 
arbitrary errors 
orthogonal errors 
 
arbitrary errors 
orthogonal errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  q  q 
   
                        Arbitrary Errors     Orthogonal Errors                    Arbitrary Errors  Orthogonal Errors 
      q = 0        [0.000, 0.061]†    [0.000, 0.061]                      q = 0   [0.000, 0.046]       [0.000, 0.046] 
                        [0.000  0.075]‡     [0.000  0.075]                     [0.000  0.070]       [0.000  0.070] 
 
           q = 0.01  [0.000, 0.102]      [0.000, 0.078]             q = 0.01  [0.000, 0.075]        [0.000, 0.067] 
                          [0.000  0.115]       [0.000  0.091]                   [0.000  0.099]         [0.000  0.090]    
 
           q = 0.05     [0.000, 0.194]       [0.000, 0.142]                 q = 0.05   [0.000, 0.185]        [0.000, 0.149] 
                         [0.000  0.207]      [0.000  0.156]                    [0.000  0.207]        [0.000  0.174] 
 
       † Point estimates of the population bounds; ‡ Imbens-Manski (2004) 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
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Figure 4 
 
Sharp Bounds on ATE = P[H(1)=1] − P[H(0)=1] with MTR and MTS:  
Comparison of No MIV and MIV Cases under Orthogonal Errors 
 
                          A. Probability of Being in Good or Better Health                                       B. Probability of BMI ≤ 85th Percentile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
                                No MIV                    MIVa                        No MIV                    MIV 
   q = 0        [0.000, 0.061]†    [0.014, 0.035]       q  [0.000, 0.046]        [0.007, 0.03             = 0 9]     
                        [0.000  0.075]‡     [0.000  0.075]                           [0.000  0.070]        [0.000  0.070]  
 
        q = 0.01  [0.000, 0.078]        [0.014, 0.050]                   q = 0.01 [0.000, 0.067]        [0.007, 0.059] 
                      [0.000  0.091]       [0.000  0.091]                           [0.000  0.090]        [0.000  0.090] 
 
        q = 0.05  [0.000, 0.142]        [0.014, 0.109]                     q = 0.05  [0.000, 0.149]        [0.007, 0.123]  
                        [0.000  0.156]       [0.000  0.154]                            [0.000  0.174]        [0.000  0.174]   
No MIV LB 
MIV UB 
MIV LB 
No MIV UB 
a. The monotone instrumental variable (MIV) is “Income-to-Poverty Ratio” 
† Point estimates of the population bounds; ‡ Imbens-Manski (2004) 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
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Appendix Table 1.  Sensitivity Analysis for Figure 1 
 
 
Value of Δ at q = 0 and Critical Value qc for when the Sign of Δ is Identified† 
 
 
                                Food Insecure:a                  At Risk of Being Food Insecure:b            Food Insecure With Hunger:c     
                            
                    l  0 arbitrary orthogonal,
c c
q q q=Δ 0 arbitrary orthogonal,c cq q q=Δ 0 arbitrary orthogona,c cq q q=Δ
                 
At Least Good Health:     0.061‡      0.014, 0.021    0.053  0.014, 0.025       0.067    0.007, 0.008 
                                       
At Least Very Good Health:        0.152      0.049, 0.059    0.151  0.054, 0.073       0.108    0.016, 0.017 
 
Excellent Health:          0.131      0.051, 0.062    0.150  0.065, 0.075       0.116    0.021, 0.027 
 
   
 
BMI ≤ 85th Percentile:     0.046      0.015, 0.018    0.041  0.015, 0.020       0.019    0.003, 0.003 
 
BMI ≤ 95th Percentile:               0.047      0.012, 0.017    0.040  0.012, 0.019       0.040    0.005, 0.005        
    
 
 
  †  arbitrary orthogonalThe sign of  is not identified under arbitrary errors when  and is not identified when  under orthogonal errors.  
c cq q q qΔ > >
  ‡  Baseline estimates presented in bold. 
   a At least three affirmative responses to questions in the 18-item Core Food Security Module (CFSM). 
   b At least one affirmative response to questions in the 18-item CFSM.  
   c At least eight affirmative responses to questions in the 18-item CFSM. 
 
Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis for Figure 4 
Sharp Bounds on ATE = P[H(1)=1] − P[H(0)=1] with MTS and MIV Under Orthogonal Errors 
            Food Insecure            Food Insecure 
                             Food Insecurea                                or At Riskb                With Hunger c    
                            
             With MTR         No MTR               With MTR         No MTR                With MTR         No MTR    
At Least Good Health:    
   q = 0               [ 0.014, 0.035]† [-0.307, 0.035]  [ 0.014, 0.023] [-0.429, 0.023]  [ 0.014, 0.035] [-0.145, 0.035]  
    q = 0.01    [ 0.014, 0.050] [-0.317, 0.050]  [ 0.014, 0.039] [-0.439, 0.039]  [ 0.014, 0.049] [-0.156, 0.049]  
    q = 0.05    [ 0.014, 0.109] [-0.358, 0.109]      [ 0.014, 0.113] [-0.479, 0.113]  [ 0.014, 0.050] [-0.163, 0.050]  
                                                                                                                                         
At Least Very Good Health:        
    q = 0             [ 0.023, 0.090] [-0.361, 0.090]  [ 0.023, 0.109] [-0.405, 0.109]  [ 0.023, 0.101] [-0.325, 0.101]  
    q = 0.01    [ 0.023, 0.109] [-0.370, 0.109]  [ 0.023, 0.126] [-0.415, 0.126]  [ 0.023, 0.129] [-0.335, 0.129]  
    q = 0.05   [ 0.023, 0.185] [-0.409, 0.185]  [ 0.023, 0.188] [-0.453, 0.188]  [ 0.023, 0.231] [-0.374, 0.231]                                 
 
Excellent Health: 
    q = 0             [ 0.000, 0.094] [-0.455, 0.094]  [ 0.000, 0.105] [-0.429, 0.105]  [ 0.000, 0.083] [-0.515, 0.083]  
    q = 0.01    [ 0.000, 0.116] [-0.465, 0.116]     [ 0.000, 0.121] [-0.439, 0.121]  [ 0.000, 0.136] [-0.525, 0.136]  
    q = 0.05   [ 0.000, 0.196] [-0.505, 0.196]   [ 0.000, 0.182] [-0.480, 0.182]  [ 0.000, 0.415] [-0.565, 0.415] 
 
             With MTR         No MTR                 With MTR          No MTR                 With MTR          No MTR  
BMI ≤ 85th Percentile: 
    q = 0               [ 0.007, 0.039] [-0.424, 0.039]  [ 0.007, 0.032] [-0.469, 0.032]  [ 0.000, 0.015] [-0.368, 0.015] 
    q = 0.01    [ 0.007, 0.059] [-0.434, 0.059]      [ 0.007, 0.051] [-0.479, 0.051]  [ 0.000, 0.054] [-0.378, 0.054] 
    q = 0.05    [ 0.007, 0.123] [-0.474, 0.123]      [ 0.007, 0.123] [-0.519, 0.123]  [ 0.000, 0.177] [-0.413, 0.177] 
 
BMI ≤ 95th Percentile:      
    q = 0             [ 0.011, 0.035] [-0.372, 0.035]  [ 0.011, 0.027] [-0.459, 0.027]  [ 0.011, 0.019] [-0.245, 0.019] 
    q = 0.01    [ 0.011, 0.052] [-0.382, 0.052]      [ 0.011, 0.046] [-0.469, 0.046]  [ 0.011, 0.042] [-0.255, 0.042] 
    q = 0.05   [ 0.011, 0.123] [-0.422, 0.123]  [ 0.011, 0.112] [-0.509, 0.112]  [ 0.011, 0.180] [-0.272, 0.180] 
 
   † Baseline estimates presented in bold. 
   a At least three affirmative responses to questions in the 18-item Core Food Security Module (CFSM). 
   b At least one affirmative response to questions in the 18-item CFSM.  
   c At least eight affirmative responses to questions in the 18-item CFSM. 
